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Abstract 
It is generally agreed that an intelligent interconnection policy is the key 
to an harmonious development of competition in the telecommunications indus­
try. The paper first warns against some hazards associated with the dominant 
regulatory paradigms. By treating retail and wholesale prices asymmetrically, 
these paradigms may distort the structure of relative prices. They may further 
provide incumbents with incentives to exclude and to cross-subsidize. These per­
verse incentives generate a legitimate suspicion and lead regulators or courts to 
substitute their judgment fot the operators' business judgment. 
Second, the paper explains the intellectual underpinnings of an alternative 
mode of regulation, which consists in putting the operator's retail and wholesale 
activities into a single basket and thus in subjecting the firm to a global price 
cap. It provides an extensive discussion of the costs and benefits of global price 
caps, and shows that they do not distort the structure of retail and wholesale 
prices. Last, global price caps eliminate or substantially -reduce the incentives 
for exclusionary behaviors and cross-subsidies, and thus allow a light-handed 
regulation. 
Resumo 
E conhecimento comum que uma politica de acesso inteligente e fundamen­
tal para garantir a competigao na industria de telecomunicag5es. 0 artigo, ini­
cialmente, alerta para as distorg5es associadas a politica regulat6ria tradicional. 
Ao tratar 0 prego de acesso e a tarifa ao consumidor de maneira assimetrica, a 
poHtica tradicional provoca distorgoes nos pregos relativos. Conseqiientemente, 
tais distorgoes fornecem incentivos as empresas incumbentes a adotarem urn com­
portamento de exclusao a concorrencia e promoverem subsidios cruzados entre 0 
prego de acesso e a tarifa ao consumidor. Tal comportamento resulta na neces­
sidade legitima de limitar a ag8.o empresarial atraves de decisoes arbitrarias por 
parte dos agentes reguladores e dos tribunais. 
IThe authors are grateful to i'vlichel Gensollen, Paul Grout, Jerry Hausman, Jerry Lumer, Nick 
Sullivan, and, especially fvIarius Schwartz for helpful discussions and comments. 
2Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse, and Institut Universitaire de France. 
3Institut d'Economie Industrielle, Toulouse, CERAS, Paris, and MIT. 
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Adicionalmente, 0 presente trabalho expoe os aspectos conceituais de uma 
politica alternativa de regula�ao para 0 setal', que consiste em erial' uma tarifa 
unica, agregando 0 prec;o de acesso e a tarifa ao consumidor. 0 artigo promove 
uma extensa discussao acerca dos custos e beneflcios associ ados a tarifa unica e 
forneee evidencias de que esta nao produz distorgoes. A tarifa unica, ao eliminar 
os incentivos para 0 comportamento de exclusao e adogao de subsidios cruzados, 
permite uma politica de regulagao caracterizada pOl' menor intervenc;ao. 
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1. Introduction. 
It is generally agreed that an intelligent access (or interconnec­
tion) policy is the key to an harmonious development of competition 
in the telecommunications industry and a number of other indus­
tries. To this end, access charges must reflect multiple objectives. 
They must induce an efficient use of networks, encourage their own­
ers to invest while minimizing cost, generate an efficient amount of 
entry into infrastructure and services, and all of this at a reasonable 
regulatory cost. 
Regulators, courts and lawmakers may strike many rocks. High 
access charges erect barriers to entry and maintain the incumbents' 
monopoly position in their potentially competitive segments. They 
also may induce an inefficient bypass or duplication of the incum­
bent's bottleneck segments. Conversely, low access charges may gen­
erate entry by inefficient entrants. They may also induce incumbents 
to foreclose access to their bottleneck and discourage them from in­
vesting in their networks. 
The choice of the overall level of access charges is thus delicate. 
So is the determination of the relative structure of these charges. An 
inadequate rate structure provides the wrong signals for the incum­
bents' choices of investment in infrastructure and for the entrants' 
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decisions of which segments to enter. For example, incumbents often 
complain about the entrants' choice to "skim the cream" . 
Two factors make it difficult for regulators to set interconnection 
charges. First, regulators generally lack the information required for 
a good access policy. Being understaffed, they know too little about 
the incumbents' and entrants' cost structures, about demand func­
tions, and about the intensity of competition. Or, they may not 
have sufficient incentives, experience, or day-to-day contacts to ob­
tain this information and put it in perspective. Second, the high 
stakes attached to the interconnection policy generate in most coun­
tries intense lobbying by incumbents and entrants as well as political 
intervention. These "political economy considerations" matter more, 
the more discretionary the interconnection policy and the wider the 
divergence between policy and sound economic principles. 
This paper has two goals. First, section 2 warns against some 
(often poorly understood) hazards of "asymmetric regulations" such 
as those set in place in the US and the UK, and which represent 
the dominant paradigm within the European Commission. Second, 
and relatedly, section 3 develops the intellectual underpinnings of a 
global price cap regulation, namely the mode of regulation consisting 
in putting the operator's retail and wholesale activities into a single 
basket, thus treating product lines symmetrically. 
While stressing the potential drawbacks of a global price cap reg­
ulation (which can be decomposed into the general drawbacks of price 
caps and the issue of predatory behavior), we explain why global 
price caps have two key benefits over current regulations. First, 
drawing their legitimacy from economic theory, they provide incum­
bents and entrants with the right signals. In particular, they promote 
efficient entry, and eliminate or substantially reduce the incumbents' 
current incentives for foreclosure and cross-subsidies. Second, and 
relatedly, global price caps allow a lighter regulation with respect 
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to the monitoring of cross-subsidization and foreclosure. While eco­
nomic theory underlies the concept of a global price cap, the prospect 
of a light-handed' and transparent regulation is an important sup­
plementary benefit in view of the Anglo-Saxon experience with the 
deregulation of telecommunications. 
2. Coherence and perverse incentives under fragmented reg­
ulations. 
2.1 Outline of the argument. 
Section '2 stresses the consistency problems raised by regulations that 
handle product lines separately. Using a rough taxonomy of existing 
and contemplated reforms, it shows that they create two types of 
asymmetries among product lines : 
• asymmetric reward structures, in that the fraction of profit kept 
by regulated operators depends on the product line, 
• asymmetric pressures on prices, in that the marginal private ben­
efits of raising prices differ across product lines. 
These two asymmetries provide incumbents with incentives for 
practicing (accounting or allocative) cross-subsidies and for exclud­
ing competitors. These perverse incentives in turn raise a legiti­
mate suspicion and forces regulators (or courts) to inquire into a 
large number of business decisions. However, as we shall see, the 
substitution of regulatory intervention for business judgement is a 
complex and hazardous matter, if only because the potentially detri­
mental behaviors might receive an efficiency defense. In our view, 
one should eliminate. the perverse incentives in the first place, rather 
than create them through the regulatory policies and then engage 
lThe setting and the revision of price cap formulas stilll'equires substantial regulatory work 
despite the decentralization of pricing to firms. 
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in heavy-handed and lobbying-prone regulation in order to eliminate 
them. 
2.2 A taxonomy of American and British reforms. 
Regulators have undertaken a large-scale revamping of the regula­
tory framework. The February 1996 Telecommunications Act and 
the ensuing FCC documents in the US', and the December 1995 Of­
tel Consultative document for the regulation of BT from 1997 on for 
example have delineated a new approach to designing access poli­
cies. To the risk of oversimplifying, we will classify current reform 
proposals along the following dividing lines: 
• Access charges 
Two main paradigms for the setting of access charges are promi-
nent in the reform proposals3 : 
- Mea: The access charge is prescribed to match the marginal 
(or incremental) costs of interconnection. In some cases, a mark­
up may be added to marginal cost. Also, the marginal cost may 
be computed at a more or less disaggregated level. 
The marginal cost in question is meant to depart from the tradi­
tional and flawed numbers drawn from fully-distributing embed­
ded costs. Rather, it is to be derived from engineering estimates 
of what it currently costs to provide the relevant element or ser­
vice. It is thus a "forward-looking long-run incremental cost" 
(also called "total element long-run incremental cost" or TEL-
21n particular, the August 8, 1996 First Report and Order "In the l'vIatter of the Local Com­
petition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996," CC Docket n096-98, known as the 
Local Competition Order and the IvIay 16, 1997 First Report and Order :'In the l\-Iatter of 
Access Charge Reform" are dosely related to .the topic of this paper. 
3 Intermediate methods may also be used in the future, for instance earnings sharing schemes 
such as the ones developed in the US by the FFC for InterLATA calls and by some states for 
IntraLATA calls. 
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RIC in the US). Important work is currently being done, in the 
US and the UK to obtain measures of marginal costs from en­
gineering estimates in an optimized network. The rationale for 
such computations is sound, as forward-looking costs do not cre­
ate the same incentives for cost inefficiency as historical costs. 
But this methodology still faces conceptual and empirical snags." 
- PCa : the second regulatory paradigm for interconnection 
charges is the imposition of a price cap on a basket of or all 
interconnection charges. 
" Retail prices 
Two paradigms are also commonly considered for the regulation 
of retail or final prices : 
PC f : The firm faces a price cap on residential and business 
services' . 
N Rf : Retail services are not regulated, and so the operator 
can freely choose its final prices. 
" Simplifying somewhat, current regulatory proposals III the US 
ofIer to let most retail services be unregulated.'. Access was 
first meant to be regulated on the basis of forward-looking long­
run incremental cost ("MCa"): See the February 1996 Telecom­
munications Act and the August 1996 Local Competition Order. 
Recently, though, the price cap solution ("PCa") has gained sup­
port (FCC May 16, 1997 First Report and Order). The Decem-
"On this see Hausman (1997) and the !\,Iay 16, 1997 FCC First Report and Order. 
S Again, one can think of variants of this regulatory paradigm, for example "subcaps" on 
residential or small business subscriber charges may be imposed, as has often been the case in the 
past. 
6This is the most common interpretation of the Act regarding retail rates, although the FCC 
subsequently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on implementing the nOllvaccQunting safe­
guards of sections 217 and 272, in which one question concerns the issue of whether regulation 
should be extended to cover interLATA services offered by the BOC's affiliates. 
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ber 1995 Of tel consultative document envisions a more hybrid re­
form for the UK Interconnection charges are split into two cate­
gories. First, the regulation of terminating access would occur at 
a very disaggregated level. It would be based on marginal costs 
and would therefore not reflect demand considerations. Second, 
BT would face a price cap on the basket of all interconnection 
services (origination and termination), thus giving the operator 
more freedom to affect the structure of relative access charges at 
the originating end. The rationale for distinguishing origination 
and termination is that origination is more easily bypassed and 
therefore more competitive'. The reform in the UK also distin­
guishes two categories of retail services : those deemed compet­
itive which, like in the US, would be left unregulated, and those 
for which competition is still emerging, which would be subject 
to a separate price cap. To sum up : 
Rough description of contemplated reforms: 
US : MCa or PCa cum NRJ 
UK : mixture {MCa, PCa} 
cum mixture {PCf,NRJ}. 
2.3 Drawbacks of a cost-based regulation of access (Mea). 
It is by no means easy for regulators to obtain precise engineering 
estimates of long-run incremental costs. A number of discretionary 
steps must be taken with respect to the elements' future usage, net­
work configuration, terrain and demographic assumptions, deprecia­
tions, technological progress, and uncertainty. Here, we focus rather 
on the conceptual questions that are raised by the pricing of access 
at long-run incremental cost. 
7This argument is stressed by Bernheim and Willig (1994). 
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Telephone networks have substantial joint and common costs 
(local loop, part of digital switches, part of transport facilities). 
Such costs must be recouped through markups above the services' 
marginal costs. Two routes have been considered in this respect. 
One consists in putting the entire burden of joint costs recovery on 
non-access services (lvICa. stricto sensu). Another route aims at re­
covering some of the joint costs through a markup on access services 
(MCa plus markup) . 
• IvICa strictu sensu. 
A poorly understood point is that an efficient recovery of fixed 
costs involves markups on access as well as retail prices· ; for, an 
operator providing access to another company is in fact offering a re­
tail service through the production of complementary inputs by that 
company. There is conceptually no reason to treat interconnection 
and retail prices asymmetrically. By shrinking artificially the "tax 
base" , the regulator is likely to generate high retail markups on ser­
vices with little competition and low or no markups on competitive 
retail services. The two categories of services need not correspond 
to low- and high-elasticity segments, respectively. Furthermore, the 
incumbent is unable to recoup its investment cost if most of its retail 
segments are exposed to competition. 
s lvICa plus markup. Alternatively one can allow the incumbent 
to charge a markup above the marginal cost of access. This i'aises 
issues concerning both the level and structure of this markUp. 
Economists have, always and almost unanimously, been quite 
8This result might seem to contradict Diamond and l\·fil'riees' HI71 production efficiency the­
orem, according to which prices within the productive sector should not be distorted away from 
marginal costs. An underlying assumption of the production efficiency theorem is that consump­
tion prices can be perfectly disconnected from production prices. The markup on access could b e  
replaced by a specific tax on retail goods produced by competitors and using access a s  an input. 
Thus, our observation is consistent with the production efficiency theorem, in the absence of 
appropriate (in level and structure) taxes on retail services. 
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critical of the way regulators compute and allocate fixed costs" . 
They advance two arguments. First, these determinations are gen­
erally unrelated to economic principles. For instance, there does not 
seem to be a rationale for Oftel's proposed exclusion of the cost of 
connecting a customer to the local exchange from the computation 
of the fixed cost (which in turn serves to compute possible mark­
ups on access) . And, as is well-known the allocation of the fixed 
cost among services is an artificial accounting construct and does 
not reflect properly the demand and competitive environment. 
Second, and relatedly, the accounting procedures, precisely be­
cause they are arbitrary, are likely to be subject to debates and 
revisions. Since the regulation of access generally occurs at a disag­
gregated level, it may be subject to political intervention and intense 
lobbying by interest groupS'O. 
Let us now turn to the structure issue. Proponents of prescribed 
markups generally envision a uniform, or at least not demand-based 
markup. It is here useful to recall the theoretical principles for an 
efficient recovery of fixed costs. These, developed by Ramsey ( 1927) 
and Boiteux ( 1956), can be applied to the determination of access 
chargesl1 Mark-ups must be higher on those (low-elasticity) seg­
ments where they distort consumption the least. They must also 
reflect the complementarity or substitutability among services. For 
example, a price increase on a service may boost the demand for 
a substitute service and therefore may be less damaging to welfare 
than if the service had no impact on the operator's other sales. It 
9See, in particular, Baumol-Willig (19S7). 
lOTruly enough, a regulatory determination of Ramsey-Boiteux prices would also be subject 
to intense lobbying as demand elasticities are hardly verifiable. In contrast, under a global price 
cap lobbying is confined to the determination of the weights in the price cap, since prices are 
determined by a profit maximizing private entity. 
llSee Laffont-Til'ole(1994). Further investigations of the structure of optimal access prices in­
clude Arnlstl'Ong-Doyle-Vickers (1996), Baumol-Ordover-Willig (1997), and Laffont-Tirole (1996). 
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is also useful to remind the reader that these two precepts (charging 
according to elasticities, internalizing externalities across services) 
underlie the sophisticated pricing strategies of unregulated firms. 
The optimality of elasticity-based pricing applies to all services, 
including wholesale services. A purely cost-based determination of 
access charges leads to an inefficient recovery of fixed costs as it 
contracts demand on final services with high elasticity of demand 
and undercharges services with low elasticities of demand, for which 
higher retail prices would have led to small distortions in consump­
tion. That is, purely cost-based access charges create creamskiming 
(excessive competitive pressure on profitable segments and insuffi­
cient one on less profitable ones) by not obeying Ramsey-Boiteux 
precepts. A similar point can be made regarding potential entry into 
the bottleneck segment. It is optimal to charge lower access charges 
where bypass is easy. Otherwise inefficient bypass will occur12• 
The standard counterargument to this critique of cost-based ac­
cess charges (see, e.g., Oftel's december 1995 consultative document) 
is that the access charge computed from the marginal cost of access 
with a mark-up defines only a ceiling and so the operator is free to 
respond to competition by lowering its access charges (subject to 
some predation test, such as the Areeda-Turner marginal cost floor). 
This downward flexibility of access charges introduces market con­
siderations and therefore constitutes a useful move in the direction of 
Ramsey-Boi teux prices. It still provides the regulator a fair amount 
of discretion in the setting of the level and structure of access charges. 
12It has for instance been argued that part of the entry of CAPs (Competitive Access Providers) 
in the US was motivated by the existence of a regulatory price umbrella linked with articially high 
access charges. Local Exchange Companies now have some downward price flexibility which 
enables them to compete with bypass providers. 
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2.4 Coherence of fragmented regulations: the threat of fore­
closure 
2.4.1 The theoretical argument 
We argue that foreclosure is more likely in the presence of asymmetric 
constraints on retail and wholesale prices. When facing a stringent 
ceiling on access charges and a looser constraint on final services, 
an operator has a strong incentive to deprive its rivals on the final 
segments from access to the bottleneck through non-price methods. 
The reforms that are contemplated in the US and the UK create 
such asymmetries among product lines. In our rough taxanomy, such 
asymmetries occur in the following circumstances : 
NRf cum {either MCa, or PCa} 
or 
loose PC f cum stringent ceiling on access charges. 
To illustrate the theoretical argument, let us consider the simple 
case of an unregulated retail market, longcdistance say, together with 
a price cap on the access charge to the local bottleneck. The access 
charge a must not exceed a cap ii that lies below the monopoly price 
on access that the operator would charge if interconnection were not 
regulated : 
a :'0 ii. 
Suppose further, and to simplify the exposition, that the opera­
tor and its long-distance competitors produce perfect substitutes at 
equal and constant marginal cost c. [The reasoning extends straight­
forwardly to differentiated services and efficiency disparities.] 
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Long distance competitors 
The cap on the access charge prevents the operator from ex­
ploiting its monopoly power on access to long�distance. AB Ersatz 
the operator would then want to charge the monopoly price, pm say, 
on long distance. The long-distance price however is constrained by 
competition. That is, the operator must charge a long-distance price 
p that is constrained by the total marginal cost of its competitors: 
In other words, competitive pressure on the final market prevents the 
operator from translating its untapped monopoly power on access to 
the competitive segment. The operator therefore has an incentive 
to deny access to its competitors or to raise their costs, in order to 
loosen the competitive pressure on the final segment. This incentive 
is stronger, the lower the cap on the access charge. 
Behaviors that deny or limit access to competitors are said to 
foreclose the latter. The private rationale for foreclosure can be to 
exclude competitors in order to reduce competition while exclusion 
is practiced, or to prey on them so as to trigger their long-term exit. 
Remark 1 : Distinction between exclusion and predation 
Unfortunately, the academic literature and the policy debate often 
mix exclusion and predation. The common features of these two be­
haviors are that they are profit maximizing and that they hurt rivals. 
126 Revista de Econometria 20 (1) May 2000 
Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole 
The rationales for the two behaviors are however quite different, and 
a regulatory environment may well generate incentives for one but 
not the other, as we will see. 
The purpose of exclusion is not per se to hurt rivals. Rather, ex­
clusion is meant to loosen the regulatory constraint. That is, hurting 
the competitor is an instrument, not a goal. In contrast, predation 
can only be profitable if it leads competitors to durably exit the mar­
ket, for example because their financial health does not allow them 
to incur necessary investments or to pay for operating expenses. Ex­
clusion increases the operator's profit while it is practiced. Predation 
lowers the operator's profit and therefore can be rational only if cre­
ates sufficient losses for the rivals that they durably exit the market 
and if future monopoly gains offset current predation losses. 
Remark 2 : Deregulation of competitive markets: A sophism? 
It is now almost universally accepted that a segment that is subject 
to strong competition should be deregulated. The two starting points 
for this belief are well-taken : On the one hand competition usually 
substitutes favorably for regulation in competitive markets. On the 
other hand, past experiments, in particular in the telecommunica­
tions industry, with the mixture of regulation and competition have 
often been unsatisfactory. For example, regulators have generated 
some inefficient entry by fixing prices on competitive segments and 
by preventing operators from offering price discounts. 
�When one of the competitors owns a bottleneck it is less clear 
that a flexible regulation, in which the operator enjoys downward 
flexibility in the competitive segments and thus can respond to com­
petitive moves, is dominated by deregulation. The situation de­
scribed above shows that the operator would have much less incen­
tives to exclude rivals if its final price itself were constrained; for, he 
would not be able to exploit its monopoly power on the competitive 
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segment once the rivals are excluded. 
2.4.2 Examples of exclusionary behaviors 
This theoretical argument has very practical implications for the 
telecommunications industry. Indeed it provides a unifying frame­
work to analyze a number of concerns that have been expressed rel­
ative to the entry of the RBOCs into the US long-distance market 13 . 
In particular, the long-distance incumbents and part of the Clin­
ton administration have listed a number of exclusionary behavior 
that the RBOCs, the owner of the local network, have practiced or 
especially could practice once they are allowed to enter the long­
distance segment. 
It is worth stressing that we do not take side on whether these 
accusations are grounded. Besides, incentives to exclude are likely 
to depend on the extent of regulatory oversight as well as the oper­
ators' desire to preserve goodwill (as with the prospect of the revi­
sion of the Modification of Final Judgement for the RBOCs before 
February 1996, and after that date, that of being authorized to en­
ter the long-distance segment under the entry standards of #271 
of the Telecommunications Act.)'4. So, past experience may lead 
us to under -or over- estimate the relevance of exclusionary behav­
iors. Rather, we use the American debate to illustrate one of our 
key points : Asymmetric regulations create perverse incentives and 
generate a suspicion towards the integrated operator. They then call 
for heavy-handed regulatory monitoring. 
Even though all exclusionary practices described in the American 
13There are too many references for them to be listed here. The readers may in particular want 
to consult Bernheim-Willig (1994) which contains many of the long-distance companies' concerns 
and, on the RBOes' side the memorandum of BeliAtlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX and Southwestern 
in support of their motion to vacate the l'vIFJ. 
14See Schwartz (1997) for a discussion of the incentives effect of entry standards. 
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debate are fundamentally related, it is useful to break them into three 
categories : 
s Refusals and delays in interconnection : 
invocation by the operator of a high cost of providing sup­
plemental capacity or of modernizing existing facilities to 
accommodate the demand for access by rivals; 
- staggering of the upgrade of switches so as to delay the intro­
duction of a new service by a competitor until the operator 
is technologically able to provide a similar service. 
s Raising rivals' costs: 
tie-ins or refusal to unbundle, thereby forcing the rivals to 
purchase functionalities that they don't need; 
- requirement that the rivals purchase costly interface equip­
ment; 
high interconnection rates ; 
price discrimination that hurts fiercest rivals; 
- technological choices (network configuration, standards, in­
terface equipment) that favor the operator over its rivals; 
s Lowering rival's demand : 
refusal or delays in providing number portability; 
- imposing long access codes on the rivals' customers ; 
- insufficient maintenance of the network. 
requirements for rivals to disclosure business plans or com­
mercial information. 
2.4.3 Exclusion or efficient behavior? 
A natural response to this long list of potential exclusionary be­
haviors would be a per se prohibition of such practices. Such an 
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attitude is however unwarranted as most of these practices can be 
justified by efficiency considerations. For example, it may be that 
the new technologies demanded by rivals indeed require a costly up­
grade of the network, and that rivals attempt to build a market niche 
that is profitable only if the operator bears part of the upgrade costs. 
Number portability may be costly to install in the short run. The 
disclosure of the rivals' business plans may allow a better dimension­
ing of the operators' network capacity. And so forth. 
Thus, the regulator can assess the grounding of accusations of 
excl usionary behaviors only through a detailed analysis of the opera­
tor's technological and commercial environment, and to some extent 
by substituting her judgement for the operator's business judgment. 
A rule of reason approach, which we have seen is conceptually far 
superior to a per se stance, requires sufficient regulatory staffing, 
a good knowledge of the technology, and independence vis--vis the 
lobbies. 
2.5 Coherence of fragmented regulations: Cross-subsidies. 
2.5.1 The theoretical argument. 
Incentives for cross-subsidies stem from a differential in the shar­
ing of earnings across product lines. An operator gains from transfer­
ring costs from a segment in which it keeps a sizeable fraction of its 
profits to another segment where consumers share a higher fraction 
of costs. This transfer often operates between a competitive seg­
ment that is deregulated or lightly regulated and a strictly regulated 
segment that is less competitive. 
Cross-subsidies are particularly attractive for the operator when 
some segment is fully deregulated while a substantial fraction of costs 
on another segment (for example regulated through some cost of 
service or profit-sharing methodology) is reimbursed. For example, if 
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50% of the operator's cost on one segment is reimbursed, a $1 cross­
subsidy with a deregulated segment increases the operator's profit 
by 50 cents. The incentive for cross-subsidies also exist, albeit in a 
weaker form, when access is subject to a price cap and retail markets 
are deregulated. As is well-known, the ratchet effect implies that 
a high profi tabili ty today leads to a more stringent cap tomorrow, 
thus inducing profit sharing. Conversely, there sometimes exists an 
explicit or implicit regulatory insurance against a low profitability, 
which adds a further mechanism for profit sharing. 
We again observe that the deregulation of retail markets may 
create bad incentives, here due to the asymmetry in profit sharing 
schemes. 
Remark: The FCC in May 1997 opted for the removal of the profit­
sharing schemes it designed for long-distance access in 1990. While 
profit-sharing schemes have attractive properties (rent extraction, 
credibility, flexibility to individual situations through the offer of 
a menu), the FCC rightly noted that in the absence of sharing or 
other segments, the scheme could give strong incentives for cross­
subsidization by the Local Exchange Companies. 
2.5.2 Examples. 
There are two main categories of cross-subsidies (the literature 
has focused on the first and neglected the second): 
" Accounting cost allocation 
The telecommunications technology gives rise to many joint and 
common costs. The allocation of these costs among products 
lines is by and large arbitrary and may be used to "cross­
subsidize" some product lines.'5. For example an operator has 
15\Ve put "cross-subsidize" in quotes because the relevant notion of cross-subsidy is debatable 
(see Laffont-Tirole (1993) p.202-203). 
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an incentive to allocate expenses relative to maintenance person­
nel, product development, marketing, connection between the 
customer's home and the first switch, etc., to those services for 
which profit sharing is the strongest. 
Cross subsidies may also have an intertemporal dimension 
through the depreciation of investment expenditures. For ex­
ample, it has been argued that US Local Exchange Companies 
can install a fiber optic network that is currently useless to pro­
vide plain old telephone services but will later be a valuable 
asset when introducing new and innovative services such that 
interactive TV and video-on-demand. To the extent that the 
investment is (partly) depreciated before the new services are 
introduced, there may be a cross-subsidy from (current) regu­
lated services to (future) unregulated ones . 
• Managerial cost allocation 
132 
In the presence of asymmetric profit sharing, the operator also 
has an incentive to allocate real resources strategically, thus 
g'enerating a social waste. The operator can allocate its best en­
gineers and marketing agents to the competitive segment, and 
leave its less efficient or yet untrained personnel with its regu­
lated segments. The CEO and top executive team may devote 
most of their attention to competitive segments and neglect reg­
ulated ones, for which high costs are sanctionned more lightly. 
Investments choices may be distorted toward low marginal cost 
on competitive segments and (substantially) high marginal cost 
on regulated ones. 
It is thus clear that managerial decisions are not geared to the 
minimization of the production cost but rather to ti18 minimiza­
tion of the cost perceived by the operator. The OPl'lotOl will 
minimize cost only if his reward is based on total cost. III ,111 OJ) 
timal regulatory ":"'me, the reward depends solely on total c(" • 
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only (under some assumptions which ensure that the trade-offs 
between underprovision of effort and rent protection are identical 
for all product lines.) Then, a uniform power of the operator's 
incentive scheme is socially optimal even when accounting sep­
aration and detailed supervisory monitoring prevents account­
ing cost manipulations. That is, the sharing of profit between 
the operator and the consumers should be based solely on the 
operator's overall cost and thus make no use of disaggregated 
information about cost at the product line level (Laffont-Tirole 
1990). 
2.5.3 Can cross-subsidies be prevented? 
It is by no means easy to prevent cross-subsidies once one has 
created incentives for them. One can require accounting separation 
and invest regulatory resources into checking that actual cost allo­
cation follows clearly defined accounting principles. This accounting 
supervision, although costly, bars the most flagrant accounting cross­
subsidies. Accountants however cannot substitute their judgment for 
business judgment. They have neither the training nor the informa­
tion necessary to evaluate investment and personnel allocation within 
the firm. It is thus difficult to measure and prevent cross-subsidies. 
2.6 Possible attitudes toward the threats of exclusion and 
cross-subsidies. 
The previous observations may lead to various points of view's. 
We saw that a per se prohibition is untenable. There are therefore 
two possible options. Either one sticks to modes of regulation that 
create incentive for exclusionary practices and cross-subsidies and 
one sets up a heavy-handed regulation that control them. In our view 
this stance (i) involves substantial regulatory cost for the government 
16\Ve here ignore the possibility of divestiture of the bottleneck segment (as for AT&T in 1984). 
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and the firms, (ii) is limited by the need to substitute for business 
judgment, and possibly (iii) is subject to strong lobbying pressures. 
Or one eliminates the perverse incentives set up by the regulatory 
framework in the first place and one reorients regulatory resources 
toward the monitoring of more circumscribed behaviors, such as pre­
dation. This brings us to a discussion of the notion of a global price 
cap, which aims at reestablishing the symmetry between product 
lines and thus provides incentives for a better allocation of resources. 
Remark on the "double price cap" (PCa cum PC!) A move 
toward a global price cap consists in setting two separate caps on 
wholesale and retail services. This intermediate step is not been cur­
rently considered by American and British regulatory authorities ; it 
however serves as a conceptual framework for the British regulatory 
reform despite the fixing of individual access prices for termination 
services. As discussed in chapter 5 of Of tel's december 1995 consul­
tative document, a double price cap reduces the coherence problem 
to a single dimension. The tradeoff then goes as follows: An access 
cap set too high relative to that for retail services erects barriers to 
entry in retail and further induces the operator to devote excessive 
attention to access activities, say to raise demand for access (despite 
the fact that it is mutilated by high access prices), relative to retail 
services perceived as less profitable. Conversely, a tight cap on access 
services creates inefficient ?ntry and limits the operator's incentive 
to invest in the network. And, a generalization of our previous argu­
ment, it also creates incentives for exclusion of rivals as serving the 
retail segments becomes quite profitable (the counterpart of a tig'ht 
cap on access is necessarily a loose cap on retail services if the firm 
is to break even). In our view, an in-depth investigation is called for, 
that will develop methods Qf ensuring coherence between the two 
caps and will compare the resulting regUlation with a global price 
cap cum some safeguard against predation. 
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3. Global price caps. 
3.1 The theoretical argument. 
As is well-known, optimal prices for a regulated firm are Ramsey­
Boiteux prices. These reflect marginal costs and demand elasticities 
so as to minimize the distortions brought about by the recovery of 
fixed costs. Reinterpreting demand as a residual demand given com­
petitive offers, one immediately infers that Ramsey-Boiteux prices 
must also reflect competitive pressure on the firm's various seg­
ments. For instance, it is inefficient to tack a substantial mark-up 
over marginal cost into the price of a wholesale or retail service if 
this induces customers to purchase from a less efficient competitor or 
a product less adapted to their needs. Concretely, Ramsey-Boiteux 
prices reflect the possibility of bypass and creamskimming, which 
make the (residual) demand for the operator's services more elastic. 
Last, Ramsey-Boiteux prices take into account the complementar­
ity or substitutability between services. For example, the price of 
a service should be higher when a price increase boosts demand for 
another service ; that is the division in charge of the former service 
should internalize the mark-up over marginal cost on the latter ser­
vice. Conversely, the prices of complementary services should be set 
below the "myopic" levels that result from looking at the demand of 
individual products in isolation. 
Both economists and non-economists often argue that regulators 
generally do not have the information to set Ramsey-Boiteux prices. 
One leg of the argument, namely the widespread shortage of relevant 
information, is correct. But taken as a whole, this argument should 
look suspicious to any observer of unregulated businesses. The lat­
ter indeed engage in sophisticated marketing strategies. They offer 
discounts to high-elasticity-of-demand customers, adjust their prices 
to competitive pressure and carefully coordinate the pricing of sub-
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stitutes or complements. The structure of unregulated firms' prices 
(although not the level if the firms have substantial market power) 
thus reflects Ramsey-Boiteux precepts. 
This suggests that the most promising alley for implementing 
Ramsey-Boiteux prices in a regulatory context is to decentralize pric­
ing decisions to the operator. The standard way of doing so is to 
impose a constraint on its overall level of prices and to let it se­
lect the price structure within the basket of services defined by the 
constraint. One can show that a global price cap, that is a price 
cap covering retail and wholesale services, leads the operator to se­
lect a Ramsey orientated price structure. In fact, a global price cap 
yields precisely the social optimum in the idealized case in which 
the weights of the cap are exact forecasts of the volumes of services 
covered by the cap'7. 
The intuition for this result is straightforward : An unregulated 
firm with market power does not maximize social welfare since it 
does not internalize the increase in consumer net surplus brought 
about by a price reduction. A $1 decrease in the price of a service 
increases consumer net surplus by an amount equal to the consump­
tion of that service. Let us now look at profit maximization by a 
regulated operator subject to a price cap covering all its services. 
The global price cap forces the firm to internalize the increase in 
consumer net surplus in proportion to the weights in the cap (the 
coefficient of proportionality is the shadow cost of the price cap con­
straint). Therefore, if the weights in the global price cap are equal 
to realized consumptions and the level of the cap is chosen appropri­
ately, the operator perfectly internalizes net consumer surplus when 
maximizing profit. 
17Sec Laffont-Til'ole (1994,1996) and also Crew and Kleindorfer (1994), Baumol-Ordovcl'-Willig 
(1996), Schwartz (1997). 
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3.2 A global price cap eliminates or substantially reduces 
the incentives for exclusion and cross-subsidies. 
o Let us begin with cross-subsidies. A global price cap makes the 
operator residual claimant for its profit until the next regulatory 
review. Any cross-subsidy can only reduce profit during that 
period. But we should also ask whether the intertemporal profit 
sharing associated with the ratchet effect (see above) can recre­
ate incentives for cross- subsidies. To the extent that the revision 
of the global price cap at the regulatory review is based on the 
operator's overall profitability, the operator cannot gain by re­
ducing its current profit through cross- subsidies (otherwise, it 
could alternatively gain by "burning money")  . 
.. Let us turn to exclusionary behaviors. Under a global price cap, 
the operator manages its product lines "symmetrically" as it 
has no built-in incentive to favor one over another. In particu­
lar, excluding buyers of interconnection amounts to mutilating a 
potentially quite profitable activity. A global price cap provides 
the operator with the flexibility to choose which product lines 
are profitable. The theoretical analysis confirms that behav­
iors that exclude rivals, raise their costs or limit their demand, 
tend to reduce the operator's profit18. One should therefore not 
18This is particularly clear in the case where rivals have no market power and the exclusionary 
practice consists in raising the rivals' cost. The exclusionary practice then is tantamount to 
the operator's raising its own cost of providing the retail service to the competitive rivals. In 
contrast, we saw that even in this simple case the operator has a strong incentive to exclude uncleI' 
fragmented regulation. 
It can be shown that a price floor on access charges may need to be added to the global 
price cap to avoid exclusionary behaviors aiming at diverting the rivals' demand (the price floor 
then serves to prevent the operator from charging a very low price on access to relax the price 
cap constraint and then to deny interconnection). The price floor may possibly be set by the 
operator's rivals, who have incentives to avoid exclusion. 
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hastily transpose concerns that are legitimate under fragmented 
regulatory schemes to global price cap regulation . 
• Last, we should stress that global price caps enable regulation 
to be more light-handed ; for, global price caps (fully or partly) 
eliminate perverse incentives and therefore diminish the need for 
regulatory oversight of the operator's decisions. A global price 
cap scheme is therefore more compatible with deference to the 
operator's business judgment than existing schemes. A global 
price cap still involves discretion with respect to the weights in 
the cap and to their revision process. 
3.3 The global price cap scheme inherits general advantages 
and drawbacks of price caps. 
While an idealized global price cap implements the social op­
timum, frictions imply that its implementation is likely to be less 
efficient than the theoretical analysis predicts. It has been pointed 
out that the implementation of global price caps raises some prob­
lems that also arise for price caps more generally, and (for some) 
for purely cost-based regulations as well. These concerns are legit­
imate, but their relevance may be limited by the fact that existing 
schemes raise similar concerns. Let us briefly recall a few difficulties 
encountered when regulating firms with price caps: 
.. Treatment of nonlinear tariffs. As is well-known, nonlinear 
prices have desirable properties. They can be used to prevent 
inefficient bypass of the bottleneck facility or to provide an ef­
ficient menu of retail choices to final customers'". Even though 
one knows how to include nonlinear prices into a price cap at 
a theoretical level (since nonlinear prices are specific instances 
19011 the other hand, nonlinear pricing may enable favoritism when competitors, or a competitor 
ancl the operator, have different sizes on the competitive segment. See Rey-Tirolc (1997) for an 
overview of the argument. 
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of Ramsey-Boiteux prices), the transposition of these principles 
to practice is still quite rough (in practice i'egulators often take 
price averages or ignore discounts for the purpose of monitoring 
compliance with the price cap). 
o Treatment of new services and of upgrades, and phasing 
out of existing services. Again, innovations in the spectrum 
of services of a regulated firm are treated in an essentially prag­
matic way (such as the exclusion of new services from the price 
cap during the year of their introduction). Too little theoreti­
cal work has been devoted to providing reasonable guidance to 
regulators in the matter. 
• Lack of intertemporal price cap. Price caps are defined 
over some limited period. They therefore imperfectly deal with 
the intertemporal dimension of some contracts (such as guaran­
tees on future prices) or of investments in goodwill through low 
prices. 
o Ratchet effect. As we discussed above, there is no pure price 
cap. Regulatory reviews imply some form of profit sharing 
(which, incidentally, is not equivalent to contemporaneous profit 
sharing). Conversely, a price cap may not be credible if it leads 
to financial losses and jeopardizes the operator's survival. 
e Setting of weights in case of substantial demand and 
cost uncertainty. Weights should equal realized quantities in 
an idealized price cap. Uncertainty about cost, about market 
demand and about the competitors' market share may however 
make it difficult to forecast these quantities accurately. We of 
course can avail ourselves of mechanisms for updating weights on 
the basis of past outcomes20• Yet the properties of such mecha-
20 See, e.g., chapter 2 of Laffont-Tirole (1993) and the early work of Vogelsang-Finsil1ger and 
Sappington discussed therein. 
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nisms (whether they converge to the socially optimal prices) are 
known only for simple situations . 
• Need for monitoring the provision of a service priced 
below marginal cost. All price caps that involve bundles give 
rise to the following hazard : The operator may charge a very 
low price of a service and ration consumers of that service. The 
price cut allows the operator to raise prices on other services 
and still comply with the requirement defined by the price cap. 
Rationing consumers is profitable in particular when the price 
of the service falls below marginal cost. 
Even though such behaviors may not be quite as profitable in 
the long run (rationing leads to a lower weight for the service in 
future regulatory reviews), they can substantially enhance profit 
in the short run. Two regulatory responses to this hazard are 
conceivable. First, the regulator can monitor rationing perhaps 
using consumers as whistle blowers. Second, (as is already the 
case under some regulatory schemes), prices can be required to 
exceed marginal costs. 
3.4 Drawbacks specific to global price caps . 
• It is sometimes feared that a global price cap may prevent regu­
lators from openly encouraging entry. This is not the case since 
the regulator can, and quite transparently, raise the weight of 
interconnection prices in the global price cap in order to provide 
the operator with an incentive to lower its access charges. [We 
do not here take a position on whether the level playing field 
should be abandonned in order to favor entrants. The possibili­
ties that inefficient entrants be durably maintened in operation 
by regulatory protection and that such policies create strong in­
centives for lobbying must be confronted with the potential gains 
of favoring entry.] 
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" It can be (correctly) observed that a global price cap does not 
address the issue of entrants' market power on final segments. 
Indeed, their optimality relies on competitive behavior by the 
entrants. Three points are in order in this respect. First, alter­
n ative schemes for regulating access also do not account for the 
existence of entrant market power. Second, it is possible to re­
duce the distortion on the entrant's (final) price by setting high 
weights on the corresponding access charge and thereby inducing 
the operator to charge low access prices to the entrant. Third, 
it is unclear that entrant market power is a central issue in the 
determination of access charges . 
• We observea that too little is known concerning the dynamics 
of weight updating in general. In the context of a global price 
cap, it would in particular be desirable to further our theoret­
ical knowledge and run simulations for situations in which two 
services (wholesale and retail) can be fairly good substitutes . 
• Last and foremost, global price caps raise a concern about the 
possibility of predation. To the extent that predation is often 
mingled with exclusion, a more common practice, this fear may 
be exagerated ; for, we have observed that a global price cap 
tends to eliminate, rather than create, incentives for exclusion. 
A price squeeze however is easy to perform under a global price 
cap : The operator can increase the access charges and reduce 
its final prices while keeping the price cap constraint satisfied. 
It thereby considerably hurts its rivals on the retail markets. 
One can then conceive a use of this strategy for predatory pur­
poses. That is, the operator reduces its profit until the next 
p r-ice review, but may eliminate rivals who may be used by the 
regulator as benchmarks in the future. The profitability of such 
predatory behaviors unfortunately has not yet been analyzed ; 
one can only presume that a) the threat of predation is more 
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relevant when competitors do not have a long purse and when 
their assets cannot easily be purchased and managed by another 
company in case of bankruptcy. b) predation is less costly to the 
firm under a global price cap than to an unregulated firm, and 
the prospective gains are less too, because the future price will 
be regulated and thus probably below the monopoly level. 
As is the case in antitrust, rules against predation in the con­
text of a regulated firm subject to a global price cap are imperfect 
and require further analysis. In our current state of knowledge, we 
feel that the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) designed 
by Baumol and Willig is a reasonable rule against predation (see 
Baumol-Ordover-Willig (1997) and Laffont-Tirole (1996) for further 
discussions of predation). This rule defines a ceiling on an access 
charge equal to the difference between the price and the marginal 
cost of the operator on the corresponding retail segment using the 
access facility. 
Given the likely concern about the possibility of predation, we 
devote the next two sections to the adequacy of ECPR as a protection 
against price squeezes. 
3.5 Adjustments to ECPR as a predation test. 
Is ECPR consistent with a global price cap and the social op­
timum and, if not, how should ECPR be adjusted ? Simplifying 
somewhat, it can be shown that the social optimum satisfies ECPR 
when i) demands facing the operator and its rivals on the retail mar­
kets are symmetrical, ii) the operator's and the rivals' costs on the 
retail segments are equal, iii) the costs for the operator of providing 
interconnection to itself and to its rivals are equal and iv) entrants 
behave competitively. Under these "symmetry assumptions" , ECPR 
is redundant in the absence of predatory behavior (a global price cap 
induces a price structure satisfying ECPR) , but is the proper test of 
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predation (from an optimal pricing viewpoint). 
In practice, various asymmetries may imply that ECPR must 
be adjusted to be consistent with the social optimum and thus be a 
good test of predation. For instance : 
• If providing access to competitors is more costly than provid­
ing it to oneself, the predation test based on ECPR must be 
modified so as to reflect the cost differential. That is, the access 
charges can exceed the operator's lost margin on the competitive 
segment . 
• On the demand side, the operator, which usually is the incum­
bent telephone company, may face an inelastic demand curve due 
to consumer inertia. One can show (at least in the case of linear 
demand curves) that the predation test based on ECPR must be 
strenghthened due to the fact that Ramsey-Boiteux final prices 
must reflect elasticities of demand. A similar argument probably 
holds in the absence of number portability. 
Conversely, the ECPR test should be relaxed when the opera­
tor installs new functionalities that enable a technologically ad­
vanced rival to offer a service that is superior in quality to that 
of the operator. It is then socially optimal that the operator 
sets prices below those of its rivals so as to reflect quality dif� 
ferentials. Such prices may well violate ECPR, which therefore 
must be interpreted more loosely to be consistent with Ramsey­
Boiteux pricing . 
.. Last, one can show that ECPR must be modified in the presence 
of a cost differential in the competitive segment. For instance, in 
the case of linear demands, ECPR must be relaxed (tightened) 
if competitors are more (less) efficient than the operator in the 
competitive segment. 
Brazilian Review of Econometrics 20 (1) May 2000 143 
Global Price Caps and the Regulation of Access 
3.6 Further thoughts about ECPR as a predation test. 
We conclude with a few thoughts concerning the application of 
ECPR to predation . 
.. A well-known flaw of antitrust in the matter of predation is that 
it may take years for the victim to win a case while its sur­
vival may be a matter of months. A regulated industry in this 
respect has the benefit of having a permanent regulator who, 
although imperfectly informed, still has much more information 
and knowledge about the industry than a court. One may thus 
imagine that tests of predation be run relatively swiftly, with the 
possibility of further resort to Courts in case of disagreement. 
On the other hand, Courts usually have superior enforcement 
powers, for example with respect to fines. 
G ECPR may be (and has been criticized as being) informationally 
demanding. The operator's marginal cost on the competitive 
segment may not be measured precisely. And to the extent that 
its computation is based on accounting data (which will likely to 
be the case) , the operator has an incentive to bias its investment 
choices so as to reduce its marginal costs on the competitive 
segments and thus to comply more easily with ECPR, assuming 
of course that it wants to prey on its rivals. For the same reason, 
it also has an incentive to exert a high effort to reduce its costs 
in the competitive segments. 
4. Conclusion. 
The notion of a global price cap is a logical consequence of 
economic reasoning. A global price cap creates a more efficient 
price structure and avoids the exclusionary behaviors and the cross­
subsidies generated by unbalanced regulatory schemes. There exists 
two types of concerns relative to the implementation of a global price 
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cap. A first set of concerns is shared by other modes of regulation 
of access. The second concern is the possibility of predation. These 
difficulties must be compared with those faced by alternative regula­
tory schemes. In particular, predation seems to be less of a concern 
than exclusion and cross-subsidies, due to its lower frequency, to its 
more ambiguous incentives, and to the possibility of using ECPR as 
a predation test. These thoughts lead us to conclude that an in­
depth reflection on ways to remedy the shortcomings of global price 
caps is likely to be more fruitful than taking refuge in schemes that 
have proved or will be hard to master. 
Submitted on May 2000. Revised on February 2001. 
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